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Abstract
Advertising, long the financial mainstay of the web
ecosystem, has become nearly ubiquitous in the world
of mobile apps. While ad targeting on the web is fairly
well understood, mobile ad targeting is much less stud-
ied. In this paper, we use empirical methods to collect
a database of over 225,000 ads on 32 simulated devices
hosting one of three distinct user profiles. We then ana-
lyze how the ads are targeted by correlating ads to poten-
tial targeting profiles using Bayes’ rule and Pearson’s chi
squared test. This enables us to measure the prevalence
of different forms of targeting. We find that nearly all ads
show the effects of application- and time-based targeting,
while we are able to identify location-based targeting in
43% of the ads and user-based targeting in 39%.
1 Introduction
1.3 million of the 1.5 million apps available on Google’s
Play Store are available for free, including 99% of the
apps with at least 50,000 downloads [2]. This is largely
made possible by advertising, which accounts for the ma-
jority of mobile app revenue in the United States, and
reached USD 19.3B world-wide in 2013 [19, 18]. Other
forms of app revenue, such as paid app sales and in-app
purchases, make up the rest of the mobile app monetiza-
tion space. This huge market depends on delivering ads
to people who are likely to respond to them.
Mobile ads are delivered through advertising libraries
which are embedded in the application at compile time.
These libraries generally use an embedded web browser,
Android’s WebView, to display the ads and handle user
interaction. (These WebViews are subject to many of
the same security concerns that impact other dated web
browsers [34].) These libraries then handle the work of
requesting the ad from a central server, displaying it to
the user, and tracking the user’s interaction with the ad.
In prior work, researchers have measured the ability
of Android advertising libraries to access permission-
protected user data [15, 31, 22, 6] as well as the behavior
of applications that directly pass user private information
to their ad libraries [7]. What remains little understood
is the way that information is used after it has been col-
lected.
In this work, we measure a more complex factor that
is also critical to the understanding of user privacy—the
interaction between advertising libraries and their host
servers. Because we do not have direct access to the pro-
prietary algorithms used in processing ad requests and
serving advertisements, we choose to treat the data center
as a black box, observing the relationship between inputs
(ad requests) and outputs (provided ads). This resembles
the methodology used by other researchers in measuring
the targeting of web applications [21, 3, 8, 26].
In-app mobile ads present interesting opportunities for
ad targeting, and bring related concerns regarding user
privacy. Advertisers face the task of delivering their ads
to a receptive audience. Some forms of Internet advertis-
ing, such as search advertising, allow effective targeting
without any user profile at all—search keywords, alone,
can indicate products and services for which a user might
be shopping. Other forms of advertising, such as on so-
cial networks, rely on extensive profiles that the user has
entrusted to the service, giving the service provider the
responsibility of using the data for ad targeting without
revealing its contents to third parties [11, 20].
In-app mobile ads, by contrast, present relatively lit-
tle information that advertisers can use for targeting. At
their most basic level, they provide a prospective adver-
tiser with little more than the name of a host application
and an IP address that can be used for rough geographical
targeting. Because of this limitation, advertising libraries
have long used some form of unique identifier to identify
the device, and hence, the user [6]. When unique identi-
fiers are correlated with other data—passed by the appli-
cation or obtained from other sources—opportunities for
more precise ad targeting begin to emerge. Our goal is to
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measure and quantify the targeting that takes place, with
an eye to elucidating the privacy implications that stem
from that targeting.
In order to maintain a reasonable scope for our work,
we chose to focus on a single platform (Android), and a
single ad library (Google’s AdMob.) Android represents
84.4% of current mobile device shipments, making it a
good proxy for the entire mobiles space [17]. Likewise,
AdMob represents 35% of the install-weighted ad library
market on the Android platform, making it a reasonable
proxy for the entire mobile ad space [7]. It is worth not-
ing that AdMob is one of the more conservative advertis-
ing libraries in regard to the amount of user data that it
collects [6]. Other libraries, with access to more personal
data, may engage in additional forms of targeting.
In studying AdMob, we are not only studying the be-
havior of the Google’s proprietary systems. Rather, we
are studying the entire AdMob ecosystem, which in-
cludes not only Google, with its engineers and systems,
but also the advertisers that make use of those systems to
place ads based on various criteria. This includes many
third parties that use ad exchanges, such as Google’s
DoubleClick, to place ads on the AdMob network. In
this way, our research represents an attempt to yield an
end-to-end understand of a complex multi-vendor sys-
tem.
2 Methodology
Measuring mobile ads presents methodological chal-
lenges due to the need to measure an ever changing data
set without the ability to take random samples [16]. New
ad campaigns are constantly being introduced, old ones
retired, and ads targeting affects each request. We sought
to overcome these factors by focusing on narrow seg-
ments of mobile ads, with a limited number of profiles,
over a restricted time period. In order to generate re-
quests, collect ads, and correlate responses to the re-
quests, we first reverse engineered the AdMob ad request
protocol. Following this, we built an AdMob emulator
that would request ads based on app parameters that we
supplied. We then developed a collection of user profiles
that would enable us to measure ad targeting. We next
rolled out a collection infrastructure consisting of numer-
ous collection stations that reported ads back to our cen-
tral server. Finally we analyzed the data we collected
to determine the correlation between possible targeting
methodologies and the ads that we received.
2.1 Reverse Engineering AdMob
In order to give ourselves maximal flexibility in prob-
ing AdMob’s behavior, we chose to reverse engineer the
AdMob ad request API rather than send requests from
stock applications on physical devices. This allowed us
the freedom of manipulating various parameters and ob-
serving the results. We began by capturing traces of the
AdMob library’s communications on a number of real
and emulated devices. Because these exchanges are un-
encrypted, it was easy for us to analyze them and identify
critical components. 1
By using a variety of applications in generating our
requests, we were able to capture the behavior of various
versions of the AdMob Android library, and thus build
a fairly complete understanding of its behavior. While
the AdMob library makes a variety of HTTP requests in
the course of its operation, we found that all of the data
necessary to request an ad is passed in a single HTTP
GET request [33].
We analyzed our request dataset and identified 88 dif-
ferent parameters set by the AdMob library. Our next
task was to determine the significance of each of those
parameters in order to emulate the library’s behavior. We
proceeded by decompiling the AdMob library and exam-
ining the code used to generate the request. In this way,
we were able to identify the code used to set the param-
eter, and identify the sources of the information that was
encoded.
While most of the parameters related to the mechan-
ics of requesting and serving ads, some parameters with
significance for user privacy are listed in Table 1. As Ad-
Mob uses ordinary HTTP to make requests and serve ads,
the content of most of these parameters is sent in clear
text. The one exception is the UULE parameter, which
transmits the device location, and is encrypted with a key
embedded in the AdMob library.
2.2 Building an AdMob Emulator
After reverse engineering the AdMob request syntax it
became possible to develop an AdMob emulator, which
would build requests that would be interpreted as legit-
imate by AdMob servers. We constructed the emulator
in Python, taking application characteristics as inputs,
and generating syntactically valid AdMob requests. The
completed emulator allowed us to vary parameters re-
lated to ad targeting while continuing to generate cor-
rect values for the built-in checksum and other changing
parameters. We tested our emulator to verify that it re-
trieved valid ads from the AdMob network.
Of course, the URL parameters are not the only pieces
of information that AdMob servers are able to gather
from a request. The request timing and IP address are
also significant. Because of this, it was necessary to
develop an infrastructure that would enable us to send
1It also makes it easy for attackers to make use of identifying in-
formation in the request to profile individuals. Indeed, it is known that
nation-state attackers have made use of this information in the past [29].
2
Field Explanation
an App name and version
cap List of device capabilities.
m - maps
a - apps (handles market URLs)
t - make telephone calls
carrier The numeric name (MCC+MNC)
of the network operator.
client Adsense publisher account ID
cust age App supplied user age
cust gender App supplied user gender
gnt Network type from Android tele-
phony manager
hl System language
isu First 32 characters of an MD5 hash
of the Android ID
kw App supplied keywords
slotname Identifies unique ad space
u audio Current state of audio playback
Speakerphone on / audio playing
Ringer on / vibrate / silent
u tz Timezone in minutes from GMT
uule Encrypted location
Table 1: Some privacy related AdMob request parame-
ters
requests from various IP addresses with a timing corre-
sponding to a realistic refresh rate for a mobile ad library.
We resolved this challenge by building a client server in-
frastructure where clients running on multiple machines
would poll a central server to request a set of ad request
URLs. Each client provides a unique ID to which the
server assigns a specific profile. The client then requests
ads from AdMob at a regular interval, returning the re-
sults to the server for later analysis.
2.3 Device Simulation
AdMob requests include a unique device ID—either a
hash of the Android ID, used on older versions, or the
Android Advertising ID, used on newer versions. We
used this phenomenon to create virtual “devices,” each
with a unique ID. We assigned each simulated device to
a different client, with only one device per client. In this
way, we were able to isolate the devices from each other.
In order to ensure our simulated devices did not re-
ceive similar ads because they were all located on the
same university network, we ensured that many of them
were located on private residential Internet connections
in the central area of our city. We avoided using gener-
ally available proxies such as Tor or PlanetLab nodes,
or resources such as Amazon S3, under the assump-
tion that those IP addresses might trigger fraud detec-
tion mechanisms at Google, or at the very least would be
grouped differently from IP addresses used by actual user
devices. Indeed, preliminary testing on public proxies
generally resulted in an empty response from Google—a
phenomenon that was associated with rejected requests.
The selection of physical locations was also important.
By keeping them all in the same geographic area, we
were able to minimize ad differences based on large scale
ad targeting. This helped us to ensure that the difference
between the ads received on different devices were due
to their different user profiles, and not to different geo-
graphic locations. Nevertheless, we were able to explore
some aspects of geographic targeting within our small
collection area.
In this way, we constructed a network of 32 simulated
devices, requesting ads for a variety of applications from
the AdMob network. Each device was configured to rep-
resent a unique user “profile” defined mainly by the apps
that were installed on the simulated device. Each had
a “fresh” randomly generated device ID that should not
have had any prior data associated with it.
While we attempted to control for factors other than
our user profiles that could be used in targeting ads, it
should be noted that our selection of IP addresses may
have had some effect on targeting. Not only may these IP
addresses have had slightly different geographical map-
pings, they may also have been associated by AdMob
with previous or simultaneous traffic by the owners of
the address. This may have resulted in ads targeted due
to factors other than our user profile. We sought to con-
trol for this by assigning a number of devices to each
user profile, allowing us to control for variations consis-
tent with prior data associated with a given IP address.
(Our home users were generally connected to the Internet
with DSL or cable modems, using dynamically assigned
IP addresses. External, long-term observers would pre-
sumably not be able to do much targeting unless they had
more information from the ISP about the customer iden-
tity behind the IP address.
2.4 User Simulation
Profiles were constructed by querying actual users from
different demographic segments about the applications
that they used on their mobile devices. This infor-
mation was supplemented with “recommended appli-
cations” lists for various demographic groups obtained
from the Internet. Once lists of applications were pre-
pared, we harvested the advertising identifiers from the
applications in question. Because AdMob is now in-
cluded in the Google Play Services library incorporated
in many Android applications, it was not sufficient to
simply test for the presence of AdMob in the compiled
application. Rather, we ran the applications on physical
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Profile 1 Profile 2 Profile 3
Fly Dragon, Fly! Realtime Stock
Quotes
Police Car Driver
3D
com.lsgvgames.
slideandfly
org.dayup.stocks com.ScnStudios.
TrafficPoliceCar
Driving
Happy Fall ConvertPad–Unit
Converter
Drag Racing
com.noodlecake.
happyfall
com.mathpad.
mobile.android.
wt.unit
com.
creativemobile.
DragRacing
Happy Jump King James Bible Trains and
Friends
com.noodlecake.
happyjump
com.hmobile.
biblekjv
com.
puzzletopstoday.
trainpuzzleforkids
Tiny Flashlight Tiny Flashlight Tiny Flashlight
com.devuni.
flashlight
com.devuni.
flashlight
com.devuni.
flashlight
Table 2: Profiles Used in Testing
Android devices, and captured network traces for all con-
nections with the Internet. We then analyzed the traces
to extract any requests to AdMob, and used our knowl-
edge of the AdMob request syntax to extract the identi-
fiers necessary to simulate requests from the app. In this
way, we verified that the applications we selected were
actively displaying AdMob ads.
In the process, we also captured traffic from a number
of other advertising libraries, which were often much less
well behaved than AdMob. We observed libraries trans-
mitting lists of installed applications, user city, state and
zip code, and other personal information, all in clear text.
However, as our research focused on AdMob targeting,
we did not seek to further quantify these observations.
We developed a pool of candidate applications from
the applications where we were able to capture AdMob
advertising information. We only included apps that
make exclusive use of the leaderboard format (where ads
are displayed as a small banner together with other con-
tent). This helped us to ensure that the ads shown across
different applications were comparable.
We selected apps from this pool to form user
profiles—each of which was a list of apps that would
be requested on a device assigned that profile. While it
would have been possible to construct a nearly unlimited
number of such profiles, we settled on three, a number
that allowed sufficient contrast to measure the degree to
which targeting occurred, while maximizing the sample
size for each profile. In this way, we were able to focus
our limited data collection capacity on a small number
of profiles, enhancing our ability to differentiate between
ads targeted at one profile or another.
Likewise, in order to keep our data as focused as possi-
ble, we chose only three apps and a control for each pro-
file, ensuring that we captured the maximum number of
ads for each app within the constraints of our limited col-
lection network, thus minimizing accidental variance be-
tween apps. Table 2 shows the apps associated with each
profile. For a control application, we selected a flashlight
application with a very high number of installs (over 100
million). We made this decision based on the assumption
that a broadly used application like a flashlight would not
strongly influence any user profile in which it was in-
cluded. This was intended to ensure that the ads served
to our different profiles would primarily be influenced by
the applications that differed among them, and not by the
control. At the same time, having the flashlight applica-
tion in all of our profiles enabled us to measure whether
the same ads were served to the flashlight app regardless
of the profile, or whether the other apps in the profile
influenced the ads served to the flashlight app.
We designed our simulated requests for each app to
be as close as possible to the actual requests generated
by the app. For most apps, this consisted of provid-
ing strings such as an app id and client id, but two apps
also included a static list of key words with each request.
The Realtime Stock Quotes app included the following
static string: finance, funds, loans, mortgage,
stock, while the Fly Dragon, Fly!, app included the fol-
lowing string: Dragon Fly, Tiny Wings, Android,
game, Dragon, entertainment, casual. We in-
cluded these strings in our simulated requests.
2.5 Network and Data Capture
Having constructed our model and our collection appa-
ratus, we proceeded to collect data for a period of one
month, coinciding with December of 2014. December is
an important month for retail advertisers, making it a log-
ical candidate. While a shorter period would have better
enabled us to avoid noise due to ad campaigns commenc-
ing and terminating, our limited collection apparatus re-
quired a longer period of time to gather a rich enough col-
lection of ads for thorough analysis. While we attempted
to maintain all of our collection points in action through-
out the entire month, we experienced some downtime at
approximately half of our collection sites, largely due to
the vagaries of using personal machines on private net-
works. Nonetheless, we managed to collect 225,000 in-
dividual ads directing users to 5,735 different URLs.
For each ad, we recorded the time the ad was received,
the simulated device it was received on (which mapped
to a specific user profile), the app it was received for, and
the raw contents of the ad. Each ad consisted of a HTML
document, which generally referenced outside images
and scripts. We developed infrastructure to parse the var-
ious ad formats that we received and extract salient fea-
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tures. As is common in web advertising, many of the
ads that we received used JavaScript redirects to display
content from another source [30]. In this case, we down-
loaded the redirect target and stored it in the database, as
well. Frequently, embedded scripts were used with the
same function—the actual content of the ad was loaded
by an external script. For this reason, we downloaded
and stored all scripts. Rather than downloading static
images, we simply stored the image URL.
Our primary factor for differentiating ads was the ad’s
target, by which we mean the URL to which the user
would be redirected if they clicked on the ad. We ex-
tracted the ad target from the final redirect. When record-
ing the target URL, we removed cache busting parame-
ters and the like, so that all URLs that targeted a given
page were counted together. In many cases, the target
was in the form of a URL that linked to one site, while
redirecting to another site embedded in a URL parameter.
In these cases, we took the final site as the target. In less
than 1% of our ads, we were not able to discern the final
site due to a redirect format that varied for each ad, and
which did not embed a redirect URL. In these cases, we
used the image URL as a proxy for the final destination.
A curious question is whether our actions here cor-
responded to users clicking on ads, which might cause
downstream “pay-per-click” cashflows, and which could
well have brought our measurement infrastructure to the
attention of AdMob’s internal clickfraud infrastructure.
We believe, by extracting the final URL from its redirec-
tor without actually visiting the redirector itself, that we
avoided generating anything that the AdMob infrastruc-
ture would recognize as a click.
2.6 Data Analysis
We used two primary statistical methods in analyzing our
data according to our specific needs. When we desired
to see if ads were uniformly distributed across various
groups, we made use of Pearson’s chi-squared test [27].
This gives us the probability that the distribution of ads
between two groups is due to chance, and thus, the prob-
ability that factors other than a uniform distribution re-
sulted in the direction of certain ads to certain groups.2
In other words, if a feature influenced the targeting of
ads, we would expect to see a high probability (generally
greater than 99%) that the distribution of ads across the
various groups was not random. If a feature did not not
produce targeting, we would expect to see a lower prob-
ability, as the distribution of ads approached a uniform
distribution.
When it came to quantifying the correlation between a
specific feature (such as a user profile) and the presence
2A group might be all ads corresponding to a user profile, app, or
device, for example.
or absence of specific ads, we made use of Bayes’ rule.
This enabled us to quantify the probability that a given
group was present based on the presence of the ad. In
other words, it gave us the correlation of a given ad with
a given group. Combined with the known frequency of
each group in the data set, this enabled us to estimate
the degree to which an ad was targeted towards a specific
profile. In other words, if an ad was targeted at a particu-
lar group with no other relevant factors, we would expect
to see a 100% correlation between the ad and the group.
If there was no targeting involved, we would expect to
see the correlation be equal to the group’s share of the
total population.
Both of these methods require a sufficient sample size
to work properly. When we have a single ad for a given
advertiser, it is impossible to infer anything useful about
its distribution among our categories. For this reason, we
chose to only analyze ads for which we had at least 50
impressions. This enabled us to have a confidence inter-
val of 8.3% or less on results in the 90th percentile with
95% surety. That is to say that if we estimated that 90%
of the impressions for a certain ad appeared on a spe-
cific profile, we would be 95% certain that our estimate
was correct within plus or minus 8.3 percentage points.
While we could have selected other values, we believe
that this cut-off allows us to confidently identify where
targeting occurs, despite allowing minor uncertainty in
the exact level of targeting that may have been affected a
particular ad.
3 Findings
We were able to reach a number of interesting conclu-
sions through our analysis of our data. It appears that
most ads in our dataset were targeted through automated
means. Nearly all ads showed evidence of being targeted
at the application level. 43% of our ads were geograph-
ical in nature, but it appeared that targeting was not ac-
curate beyond the level of the metropolitan area. 95%
of ads showed time-based targeting effects, as well, al-
though it is possible that the intentional targeting of some
ads skewed the time distribution of others. Finally, we
were able to determine that 39% of the ads for our control
application showed the influence of user-based targeting.
More interestingly, we were able to identify a number of
ads that appeared to be targeted at the human users of the
IP addresses on which we were conducting our testing.
3.1 Immediate Observations
We found 3,078 unique targets out of our dataset of
228,794 ads. Some targets were extremely common,
with 21,372 impressions recorded for the real estate web-
site Trulia.com. At the other end of the spectrum, we
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Figure 1: Number of impressions per ad
Number of Networks Detected Number of Ads
0 19734
1 128112
2 79637
3 1075
4 236
Table 3: Number of ad networks detected found for dif-
ferent ads
received only a single impression for 725 targets. See
figure 1. The large number of unique targets shows the
vibrancy of the mobile advertising market.
We also tallied the total number of distinct advertising
networks that were involved for our ads. We extracted
network names from the JavaScript that loads the ads,
as well as the click URLs. Often, a single ad might
involve the coordination of several ad networks. For
example, a click URL might include a parameter that
provides the redirect URL for another ad network, and
that URL might, in turn, point to a third. Of course,
our analysis was limited by our ability to identify net-
work involvement from the HTML, JavaScript, and tar-
get URLs that we received. We may have failed to iden-
tify some networks whose activity did not leave any trace
in our record, our when our analysis software was simply
not calibrated to detect the traces of involvement from a
given network.
We were able to identify 27 distinct ad networks that
were involved in placing ads on AdMob. Some ads had
multiple networks. The number of networks that we were
able to identify for each ad are listed in table 3. The fact
that multiple networks are involved sometimes points to
the mergers in the advertising industry (for example, the
acquisition of JumpTap by Millenial Media) [1]. How-
ever, it also points to the nature of ad exchanges, where
companies can purchase ads on each other’s networks.
We will discuss some of the privacy implications of these
exchanges in section 3.7.
Before entering into a statistical analysis of the
data, it is worth noting some patterns that emerge
from the ad URLs, themselves. Often, we see some
identifying data encoded into the ad request URL,
allowing the advertiser to track or target ads based on
some features of the device. For example, car ads from
everesttech.net feature strings like ev pl=mobileapp:
:2-com.puzzletopstoday.trainpuzzleforkids
and ev dvm=android+sdk. These strings, of course,
tell us little about the targeting in the delivery of the ads,
but only about customization and tracking that might
occur after a user clicks on an ad.
Other clues provide some glimpses into the tar-
geting mechanisms used. For example, on-click
URLs in ads from Luminosity feature strings
such as Category=arcade, Category=tools, or
Category=finance, which correspond to the app in
which the ad is embedded (slideandfly, mathpad, and
DayUp Stocks, respectively). This suggests that that the
ads have been targeted at specific categories of apps.
(They all redirect to the same URL.)
In other cases, multiple ads by the same advertiser can
give us some hints into targeting. For example, four dis-
tinct Twitter ads were found with significant frequency
in our dataset. One redirected to the main Twitter home-
page, one to US news, one to US sports, and one to a
Tim Howard page.3 All four ads appeared only on the
Trains and Friends children’s game app, but they were
evenly spread across the different devices requesting ads
for that app. This app, which involves assembling a 9-
16 piece puzzle of a popular toy train, appears to be tar-
geted at children around the age of 3, which is not the
usual Twitter demographic. In this case, ads that seem
to be designed for different demographics appear to have
all received the same incorrect targeting—all being dis-
played on an app targeted at toddlers too young to use
Twitter. This implies a failure in an automated targeting
system. Presumably Twitter created the different ads to
appeal to different demographics, and relied on an au-
tomated targeting system—either its own, Google’s, or
one belonging to a third party ad broker. This system de-
termined that users of the Trains and Friends app were
likely to respond to Twitter ads—perhaps because of a
click or two by a toddler who liked pretty blue birds.
This might have directed additional Twitter ads to the
same, presumably inappropriate, app. Of course, other
scenarios could explain this coincidence, but the use of
automated techniques to select the app in question seem
likely.
Sometimes, however, different campaigns from the
same advertiser target different apps. For example, three
3Tim Howard, goalie for the U.S. side in the recent World Cup com-
petition.
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Figure 2: Histogram showing correlation of ads to apps
Dollar General campaigns in our dataset appeared on
different apps. The Easy Meals Holiday Blogger Chal-
lenge ads displayed broadly across the children’s apps
and flashlight app. The Gifts that Glow campaign ap-
peared exclusively on the Tiny Flashlight app across all
of our devices, while the Tips and Ideas campaign ap-
peared exclusively on the Happy Fall and Happy Jump
applications on two of the devices that requested ads for
those applications.
The broad spread of requests across different devices
using these applications suggests that we are dealing with
application-based targeting. However, the question re-
mains of whether a human with a sense of humor de-
cided to target Gifts that Glow at a flashlight application,
or whether an algorithm discerned that flashlight users
might be attracted to glowing things. In order better to
understand these questions, let’s consider some empiri-
cal results.
3.2 App-Based Targeting
It is no surprise that ads are targeted on the basis of which
app that they are displayed in. What is more interesting is
that every ad in our dataset showed a statistically signif-
icant correlation with the app in which it was displayed.
All ads showed a greater than 0.9 cumulative probability,
with the great majority showing a greater than 0.999 CP
of app-based targeting based on Pearson’s chi squared
test. Indeed, 125 of the 466 ads with at least 50 im-
pressions appeared in only one application. When the
distribution of ads across apps is plotted in a histogram,
an interesting bimodal distribution appears. See figure 2,
where each ad is counted based on the app to which it
has the highest correlation. 138 of the ads show a greater
than 95% correlation with a specific app. The rest are
spread in a wide distribution centered on 40-45% corre-
lation. This is a higher correlation than one would ex-
pect in a random distribution across 10 apps, which ex-
plains why the chi squared test showed that all of the apps
showed the effects of app-based targeting.
The 45% mode implies that the ads that are not ex-
clusively shown on a single app are still more likely to
appear on some apps than others. That is to say that
there is a group of one or more apps where the given
ad is particularly likely to appear. While some of these
groupings may be due to ads being redistributed due to
the app-based targeting of other ads, we will show in the
following sections that a great deal of the effect is due to
user and device-based targeting.
There are three possible sources of app-based target-
ing. It could originate with the advertisers themselves
selecting certain apps to target. It could emerge from in-
termediaries who place ads on behalf of the advertisers,
or it could emerge from the design of the AdMob sys-
tem, itself. It is likely that some of the distribution of ads
across apps are due to the limitations of our collection
model such as the extended collection period. Nonethe-
less, given that no ads within our dataset were uniformly
distributed across all of our applications it appears that
some methodology was applied to all of them. As Ad-
Mob was the only entity involved in the placement of
every ad in our dataset, it seems highly probable that Ad-
Mob uses application-based targeting in directing ads.
Of course, this does not exclude the likelihood of tar-
geting by advertisers and other intermediaries, nor does
it exclude the use of manual targeting. Indeed, the Ad-
Words campaign management console (which is used to
place AdMob ads) includes app specific settings [14].
However, the incidence of humorously misdirected ads,
such as Twitter ads being sent to toddlers and weekend
car rental ads being sent to drag racing game players,
suggests that many ads were targeted to a particular ap-
plication based on an automated system rather than hu-
man involvement.
3.3 Location-Based Targeting
Location-based targeting is also possible with varying
degrees of precision. It can be as general as target-
ing a metropolitan region, or as specific as targeting ads
only to users standing outside a specific store. The Ad-
Words campaign management console allows location-
based targeting down to the neighborhood level [14]. See
figure 3. Our methodology sought to minimize opportu-
nities for location-based targeting by locating all of our
collecting stations in a limited geographic area. Nonethe-
less, we were able to extrapolate some data regarding
location-based targeting from our data set.
While it was impossible for us to extract advertisers’
actual targeting settings from AdMob, we were able to
gather a great deal of information from the content of
their ads. We manually surveyed all of the click URLs
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Figure 3: AdWords console—Location targeting
that appeared at least 50 times in our dataset, identifying
those intended for a local audience. We based this deter-
mination on whether the ad was for a local business, or
made an explicit reference to our location. In this way,
we determined that at least 43% of our ads were geo-
graphically targeted. Of course, this number represents a
lower bounds, as ads without any explicit regional refer-
ences may still have been part of a regional advertising
campaign.
We then sought to understand how accurate the target-
ing was. A few ads were wildly mis-targeted. For exam-
ple, we received 520 impressions for the Salem, Mass.
Planet Fitness location, and 55 impressions for a Renton,
Washington Ford dealership—both over 24 hours away
from our location by car. Aside from a few such aberra-
tions, however, most of the targeted ads correctly identi-
fied at least our metropolitan area.
One factor in our dataset enabled even more de-
tailed analysis. Included in our dataset were 137
ads, totaling 65,827 impressions, from localsaver.com.
These ads had the the convenient URL format of lo-
calsaver.com/[STATE]/[CITY]/[BUSINESS]/[AD]. This
enabled us to know which locations were being targeted
by the advertiser, at least at the city level. A local-
saver.com customer support representative clarified to us
that ads would only be shown within a ten mile radius of
a business location.
Out of the localsaver.com ads that we received, 99
were targeted at the core city where our collection sta-
tions were located. The remaining 38 were targeted at
seven suburban locations that surrounded the central city,
one smaller city 90 miles away, and one location that ap-
peared to be mis-classified from a nearby state. Only one
of the suburban locations was within a ten mile radius of
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Figure 4: Time distribution of six most common ads
any of our researchers.
Assuming that there was no intentional misdirections
of ads targeted for one area to a nearby neighborhood,
this implies that the location-based data that Google was
able to extract from our requests was accurate only to the
level of our metropolitan area. We chose not to provide
GPS coordinates with our requests, as the majority of
apps with the AdMob library enabled do not collect GPS
data [6, 7].
To sum up, 43% of our ads were geographical in na-
ture. We were able to identify that a large portion of
these (at a minimum, the localsaver.com ads) were tar-
geted at more specific locations within our metropolitan
area. However, there was no evidence that Google was
able to reliably identify our location with a greater preci-
sion than at the metropolitan level.
3.4 Time-Based Targeting
Another dimension of ad targeting practiced by adver-
tisers and enabled by Google is time-based advertis-
ing [14]. While the user’s timezone is the only personal
data needed to practice this sort of advertisement, it al-
lows advertisers to target a user at specific points of their
day, and thus, implicitly, at different locations. An ad dis-
played in the middle of the day may well be seen at work,
one displayed in the evening will likely be displayed at
home.
In order better to understand this phenomenon, we cre-
ated 24 buckets, one for each hour of the day, and exam-
ined the distribution of ads for each target within those
8
24 buckets. This enabled us to measure the distribution
of our ads across the different times of the day. Figure 4
shows the time distribution for the 6 most heavily adver-
tised sites in our dataset.
As can be seen, there are notable time-based factors in
some of these ads. The Trulia ad is shown much more
heavily in the afternoon and evening, with a sharp drop-
off at midnight. By contrast, the Enterprise ad spikes
at midnight, and trails off through the early hours of the
morning. The Target ad has a curious spike at 11:00 AM,
while the Kroger Softcoin ad is most heavily displayed in
the afternoon.
While some of the variations may have been due to
oddities in the distribution system — for example, spend-
ing a daily budget that began at midnight — others seem
to imply intentional targeting. The Trulia curve, for ex-
ample, would suggest an advertiser choosing to target
individuals browsing the Internet after work—perhaps a
likely time for individuals to explore real estate.
We know that individual advertisers can prioritize cer-
tain times of day for their advertisements. Less well
known is whether the AdMob system uses automated
time-based targeting algorithms. Nearly all of our ad-
vertisements showed strong time-based variations, with
95% of ads showing a less than 1% probability of hav-
ing a uniform distribution across the various hours of the
day, according to Pearson’s chi squared test. It is pos-
sible that this is an artifact of certain ads competing for
various prominent hours of the day, and other ads being
forced to less desirable times.
To better understand this phenomenon, we considered
the “early morning” ads—those which had the majority
of their impressions shown between midnight and 6 AM.
We identified 58 ads with 14,000 impressions as being
in that category. We then categorized these ads in an at-
tempt to see if there was anything in common that would
suggest an algorithm targeting late night users. How-
ever, the ads were broadly spread across a variety of cat-
egories, without any obvious correlation to late night ac-
tivity. This suggested that their prevalence in the late
night category was simply due to pressure from other ad-
vertisers in other time slots rather than any human or al-
gorithmic targeting. However, this conclusion must be
regarded as tentative, as it is difficult to account for all of
the factors that might be used for targeting.
3.5 User Based Targeting
Perhaps the most powerful and potentially intrusive form
of targeting is targeting based on the actual user of the
device. To the extent that the advertiser is able to make
use of a user profile that is predictive of interests, moti-
vations, and purchasing habits, they will be able to direct
ads to users who are most likely to be influenced by them.
Figure 5: AdWords console—Demographic targeting
Figure 6: AdWords console—Interest targeting
Our system developed user profiles built around col-
lections of applications—a single “device” had a few ap-
plications installed on it, which a simulated user used in
sequence. One application—a flashlight application—
was the same across all simulated devices. Our hypoth-
esis was that the AdMob infrastructure would build a
profile of user interests based on the installed applica-
tions, and display different ads in the flashlight applica-
tion based on the different user profiles. To the extent
that the ads are random, targeted at the flashlight app, or
targeted by factors such as location or time (which are
similar across all devices), we would expect a uniform
distribution of ads across profiles. To the extent that the
ads are targeted based on user profiles, we would expect
the profile to correlate with certain advertisements.
We applied Bayes’ theorem to all of the ads that were
displayed at least 50 times for the flashlight app, calcu-
lating the probability that a given user was requesting ads
given that a a specific ad was being displayed. We found
that 77 of the 199 ads (39%) predicted a given user with
greater than 90% certainty. The fact that a sizable num-
ber of ads correlated with a given profile is sufficient to
indicate that an ad may be targeted based on prior appli-
cations used on the same device.
Looking at the broader group of all ads, we see that
116 ads appear exclusively on a single profile. This is
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Figure 7: Histogram showing correlation of ads to pro-
files
actually lower than the 125 ads that target a single app,
due to the flashlight app being included in multiple pro-
files. However, we find that 203 ads show at least a 95%
correlation with a single profile, as opposed to the 137
that showed the same level of correlation with a single
app. Figure 7 is a histogram showing the correlation of
different ads to specific profiles. It lacks the clear bi-
modal character of figure 2, while generally showing a
high level of correlation.
It should be noted that this figure subsumes many of
the effects of app-based targeting, as most apps are in-
cluded in only a single profile. At the same time, it helps
us to understand how ads that appear in multiple apps
are targeted based on user profiles. The shift from a bi-
modal to unimodal distribution implies that much of the
grouping of ads across a small subset of applications was
in fact due to user targeting. The smaller number of ads
shown exclusively on a single profile combined with the
larger number of ads that were at least 95% predictive of
a single profile shows that there may be somewhat less
accuracy to user targeting, as a few ads are targeted out-
side the profile, while the great majority reach the same
profile. Finally, it should be noted that any device-based
targeting will also appear as profile-based targeting in
this data.
3.6 Targeting based on real users
Surprisingly, even after accounting for user profile and
application, there were some significant variations across
devices. Some of this may be explainable by fine grained
geographic targeting that differentiated among our de-
vice locations, and some may be explainable by the lim-
itations of our data collection methods. Nonetheless,
there is reason to believe that some of this variation may
be due to other Internet traffic from the same home net-
work or IP address.
Device 1 Device 2 Device 3
Maid Service Electronic Test
Equipment
Martial Arts
Blogger Chal-
lenge
New Homes Cosmetic Den-
tistry
The Bath Special-
ist
Brain Games Shredding
Home Staging Casino Insurance
Vans (shoes) MS in Technol-
ogy Commercial-
ization
Business Financ-
ing
Japanese Art Auc-
tion
ChromeCast Business Law
Christian High
School
BlackJack Enterprise
Backup
Spa Services Student Loans
Church Advertise Your
Business
High-end appli-
ances
Table 4: Ads that appear to have been IP targeted
To be clear, a substantial portion of the advertisements
observed on a given profile showed an approximately
uniform distribution across the various devices that em-
ployed the profile. (cumulative probability < 0.75)
Nonetheless, there were certain advertisements that ap-
peared nearly exclusively on specific devices. Table 4
shows ads that appeared on selected devices more than
twice as frequently as they appeared on other devices
with the same profile.
After sharing these lists with the individuals that
agreed to the use of their home networks for data collec-
tion, several of the individuals were able to confirm that
the lists appeared to be related to their Internet brows-
ing. This seems to indicate that the variance is due to
user targeting, and not to geographic variations, natural
variance, or timing issues.
It is also noteworthy that certain devices attracted a
large number of ads not seen on any other device, while
others remained much closer to the median for their pro-
file. This further suggests that for certain devices (partic-
ularly the ones on home networks) additional targeting
information was available, resulting in advertisements
that differed from the norm.
The method used in targeting these ads is not entirely
clear. It seems probable that they are targeted based on
other traffic from the same network or device. Our col-
lector ran as a Python script on a host computer that may
have also been used for web browsing, but did not make
use of any browser components, eliminating the possibil-
ity of shared cookies or other features that might identify
a particular browser instance.
There are multiple methods that could be used to iden-
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tify a network or device in a semi-persistent manner.
One of the most invasive would be something similar
to Verizon’s PrecisionID—a system that attaches track-
ing metadata to all requests from a specific mobile de-
vice [4]. However, the authors of this paper are unaware
of any such system for the home DSL and cable networks
with dynamic IP addresses, such as the ones used for
the majority of our collection stations. This suggests IP
address-based targeting.
Because most home Internet systems do not provide
for static IP addresses, IP-based targeting by itself would
not provide a way to persistently associate behavior with
a subgroup of users. Two techniques could be used by
AdMob to overcome this deficiency. The simplest would
be to maintain IP-based targeting data for a limited pe-
riod of time, associating only recent behavior with a
given IP address. A more invasive system would asso-
ciate an IP address with a user profile when identifying
information is sent from that address—for example, a
cookie in a web browser. Once the association is made,
ads could be targeted to the IP address based on informa-
tion previously collected on that user, without a need for
identifying information to be included in every request.
After a timeout, or if the user appeared at a different ad-
dress, the association could be removed.
Privacy Implications Assuming that our testing appa-
ratus received ads that were targeted based on other traf-
fic from the same network—whatever methodology was
used to characterize the users of that network—several
privacy concerns emerge. One concern is that adver-
tisements can be used to infer the targeting criteria used
to display the advertisements in question [21, 9]. This
means that anyone with access to a network can infer
characteristics of the other individuals using that net-
work. If the number of users is relatively small, it may
well be possible to attribute those characteristics to a spe-
cific individual. Another concern relates to the databases
used to target the ads. To the extent that individual users
are identified, a profile of their usage habits and behavior
can be assembled that could imply various pieces of per-
sonal or medical data that are associated with significant
privacy concerns.
3.7 Targeting and Ad Exchanges
So far, we have distinguished between different entities
that may engage in ad targeting. Now, we would like
to focus on the specific mechanisms that allow organiza-
tions other than Google to target ads on AdMob. AdMob
participates in Google’s DoubleClick ad exchange [12].
Advertising exchanges allow advertisers, brokers, and
other advertising networks to bid on ad inventory in real
time, and provide various data points that bidders can
use in targeting their ads. The DoubleClick ad exchange
interface allows a bidder to decrypt the Android Adver-
tising ID (a unique device ID). It also provides some
or all of the following data: the first three bytes of the
user’s IP address, a numerically coded location at the city
and zip code level, an application identifier, a geofence
of latitude and longitude coordinates, user time zone,
gender, age range, user membership in cookie-defined
remarketing lists, user languages, content classification
as weighted values on up to 2208 codes, mobile device
platform, brand, model and OS version, mobile carrier,
screen size and orientation, user rating for the app dis-
playing the ad, as well as information regarding ad for-
mat [13].
As can be seen, this information is more than suffi-
cient to target ads without relying on any targeting algo-
rithms employed by Google. It is also difficult to detect
which ads were directly placed with AdMob, and which
have been brokered through DoubleClick. Given this
limitation, the infrastructure about which we are drawing
our conclusions must be thought of in a comprehensive
sense, as including not only Google’s own infrastructure,
but the infrastructure of other companies that place ads
through DoubleClick.
Privacy Implications The practice of sharing ad re-
quest data with third parties through ad exchanges ex-
poses a number of privacy related questions. While the
request APIs are not open, and a significant amount of
server capacity would be needed to process the full data
stream, it exposes sensitive user information to a poten-
tially unlimited number of third parties. The combina-
tion of geographic information and a unique device ID
makes it possible to associate the ID with a specific in-
dividual. (Device-unique IDs are also available through
API calls by Android apps with only the default permis-
sions.) It then becomes possible to track that individual
throughout their day by observing their change in loca-
tion and which apps they use, with all of the data that
can be gleaned by knowing at what times of the day a
user accesses their phone.
Because the consumers of the ad exchange data are
themselves advertisers, it would be reasonable to expect
that they would make use of this data—either now or in
the future—to integrate the available data with outside
data sets in order to build more comprehensive user pro-
files and hence better marketing. The possibilities be-
come even greater when one realizes that ad exchanges
receive data from multiple ad libraries on multiple plat-
forms, and thus have the potential to provide a very com-
prehensive view of a vast number of people.
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4 Comparison with Web Advertising
Given that web advertising is relatively well understood,
and that the social consensus regarding privacy issues in
web advertising is better formed, it is worthwhile to com-
pare targeting in mobile applications to targeting in web
advertisements. First of all, it is worth noting that the
two forms of advertising have much in common—mobile
ads consist of HTML rendered in a compact web browser
embedded in an application. Furthermore, we have ob-
served that the distribution mechanisms for mobile ads
resemble those for web advertisements.
Targeted ads based on user profiles are ubiquitous in
the web environment, despite various policy initiatives
to limit them [23]. Indeed, successful companies have
built their business models around building user profiles
for the purpose of ad targeting [5]. Likewise, researchers
have made progress in measuring ad targeting and deter-
mining the criteria used to target different ads [21].
As with web advertising, mobile ads are not necessar-
ily hosted by the ad network that displays them. Rather,
redirects and mediation responses direct the advertising
library to display ads from a variety of sources over the
standard HTTP interface. This allows additional parties
exposure to the AdMob library, and allows them to prac-
tice their own targeting.
Despite the various privacy concerns that emerge from
the design of Android advertising libraries, mobile ad-
vertising does possess some privacy benefits relative to
the web [28]. Because each application uses a separate
instance of the advertising library, it is not possible for
an advertisement or tracker to set a cookie that tracks a
user across multiple applications. (Of course, there are
various unique device identifiers that can provide similar
tracking.)
Upon disassembling the Google Play Services client
library (version 6.5 —December, 2014), we were able to
verify that Google does not enable cookies in the Web-
View used by AdMob, making it somewhat more diffi-
cult for advertisers to track devices. AdMob does, how-
ever, make use of the Android Advertising ID—a persis-
tent device ID which can be manually reset by users, but
only after a thorough search of their settings. Addition-
ally, the very separation of web data (tracked by cookies),
and mobile data (tracked by a device ID) provide some
privacy benefits—although merging multiple sources of
data on a single user is not impossible.
Furthermore, apps typically provide less visibility into
their internal content than web pages do. While an app
can provide keywords and other metadata through ad li-
brary API calls, most do not [7]. This means that an ad
embedded in, for example, a music player, can target the
user based on the fact that they are listening to music, but
it can not target a user based on the type of music they
are listening to (or build a database of the user’s listen-
ing preferences) unless the app is explicitly designed to
share that information with the ad library.
Examining AdMob 6.2.1 and Google Play Services
6.5, we observed that JavaScript was enabled, which is
not surprising, given that many of the ads that we ob-
served contained JavaScript content. However, we did
not observe any hooks enabled by addJavascriptInter-
face() to call native code. This protects AdMob from
a bug in Android that allows JavaScript to execute arbi-
trary Java code through reflection on versions of Android
before 4.2 [25].
On the flip side, the nature of mobile devices presents
some new privacy concerns. Because a user typically
carries their mobile device with them throughout the day,
a mobile device introduces new levels of user tracking.
Even without a GPS, this process can potentially leak
much more information about a user. With GPS, the de-
gree of detail is much higher. Likewise, while a user
might move between various web browsers in the course
of a day—for example, when they move from home to
work—the mobile device remains always with them.
Additionally, the nature of mobile tracking IDs make
it easier for marketers to correlate data from different
sources. Most web tracking is done through cookies or
similar unique identifiers placed on the user’s computer
when they visit a web page [24]. Thus, there is no easy
way to correlate data from two different datasets, keyed
to two different sets of cookies. However, when a track-
ing ID is embedded in the device, it becomes much sim-
pler to correlate two datasets and build more complete
user profiles.
In short, while there are nuances in detail between the
possibilities of user targeting on the web and on mobile
devices, both have significant user privacy implications.
As more and more of peoples’ time and lives move into
the digital world, these privacy issues will be of growing
concern.
5 Conclusions
This work is the first of which we are aware that attempts
to quantify ad targeting in mobile advertising. We have
been able to show that a large portion of mobile ads are
targeted based on application, user location, time of day,
and profiles built around actual users. While our obser-
vations are limited to ads displayed through the AdMob
library, this represents the largest single source of An-
droid advertisements. We believe that other advertising
libraries and operating systems would show similar be-
haviors.
While our research was not intended to discern
whether ads are targeted based on specific user identi-
ties, we did find that detailed user profiles appeared to
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be involved in the targeting of mobile advertising. Given
that mobile ads are associated with a unique device ID, it
becomes clear that there are significant privacy implica-
tions to the collection of data related to the targeting of
mobile ads.
Given the steady progress of technology, it is reason-
able to expect user profiles to become ever more accurate
and personal, making the distinction between personal
identification and a theoretically anonymous profile more
and more difficult to sustain. Given the known ability to
infer detailed personal information given a large enough
data set of relatively nonsensitive information, we be-
lieve that the challenge of targeting can not be addressed
by limiting the type of data collected, but is an intrinsic
characteristic of the collection of large user datasets [10].
An additional issue is the question of who should have
access to profiles regarding a given individual. Internet
advertising has the potential to leak profile data to vari-
ous third parties [26, 9, 21]. However, there are also tech-
nical solutions that can limit data sharing while maintain-
ing targeted advertising [32].
In this context, there is a need for a greater awareness
of the privacy implications of mobile advertising, which
we hope would lead to a greater social consensus regard-
ing which personal information should be private from
whom. On the basis of such a consensus, society will
need to take appropriate steps to manage the collection
and use of personal information, both in advertising and
beyond.
6 Future Work
There are a number of ways that we would like to ex-
tend our current research in the future. At the most basic
level, we would be able to provide greater precision in
our results by engaging in larger scale data collection.
The ideal data set would include all mobile ads shown
for a given period of time. Such a dataset could be ap-
proximated by collecting data from an Internet backbone,
as ads are sent in clear text, but there are obvious ethical
and logistical issues to doing so.
While it is probably not possible to build a complete
data set, we would like to build a better one. That would
require more collectors running for a shorter period of
time, so that we could better minimize unwanted tempo-
ral effects. We would like to have a more carefully ar-
ranged geographical distribution of our collectors, with
several clusters in neighborhoods and cities with differ-
ent demographic characteristics. Likewise, with a suffi-
cient number of collectors, we could vary device types
and cellular networks which may also influence ad tar-
geting. That would enable us better to measure geo-
graphic effects of targeting, and to infer targeting based
on income, ethnicity, and other factors.
Additionally, we would like to measure the accuracy
of ad targeting by doing it ourselves. With a well struc-
tured collection network as described above, we could
target our own ads at specific demographics, and observe
the extent to which our targeted ads are received by our
collectors. This would give us a greater degree of ground
truth as to how effective targeting actually is.
Finally, we would like to obtain access to the data
stream from an advertising exchange. Doing so would
enable us to quantify our intuition that detailed user pro-
files can be built from ad exchange data without ever
needing to place an ad. We would then be able to com-
pare actual device advertising IDs with the profiles that
we had inferred, in order to measure our success at com-
promising user privacy.
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